Abstract
17
Optimization problems in which one or several decision-makers that consider one or several objective 18 functions, analyze how to act in an optimal way constitute the essence of operations research models. 19 Optimization theory analyzes situations in which one decision-maker faces an optimization problem with 20 one or several criteria. If several decision-makers interact conventional game theory is a suitable frame-21 work. (See Owen, 1995 for further details.) Finally, when several decision-makers each one controlling 22 several criteria interact it appears multi-criteria game theory. A methodological approach to cooperative 23 games with vector-valued payoff can be seen in Fern a andez et al. (2002) . 24 Traditionally, operations research focus on choosing the optimal alternatives and game theory focus on 25 models of competition and cooperation. Nevertheless, recent developments in both disciplines have shown 26 strong interplay between then. These models are called Operations Research Games (see Borm et al., 2001 ). 27 In these models apart from the inherent optimization problem it arises the natural question of how to 28 allocate the joint cost/benefit among the individual decision-makers. Recently, a new issue in game theory 29 has been to consider the multi-criteria operations research games, see for instance Nishizaki and Sakawa 30 (2001) and Fern a andez et al. (2001) .
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31
In this paper we concentrate on the minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) game. These games arise from 32 analyzing the problem of allocating the costs of a spanning tree in a graph among the users which are 33 located at the nodes of a graph, with one node reserved for a common supplier which is not to participate in 34 the cost sharing. This problem was first introduced by Claus and Kleitman (1973) . Bird, in 1976, suggested 35 a game theoretic approach to the problem and proposed a cost allocation scheme that consists of assigning 36 to each player (node) the cost of the edge incident upon the node on the unique path from the source to the 37 mentioned node in a minimum cost spanning tree. Since there can be more than one minimum cost 38 spanning tree for a graph, this way of dividing the costs need not lead to a unique cost allocation. Later on, 39 Granot and Huberman (1981) showed that the allocations arising from BirdÕs cost allocation scheme are 40 always in the core of the mcst-game (see Curiel, 1997) . 41 Situations in which the cost associated to an edge is a vector instead of a single number yields to multi-42 criteria minimum cost spanning tree games that we analyze in this paper. 43 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to define the Pareto-minimum cost spanning tree 44 game as a set-valued transferable utility (TU) game. We include the necessary concepts about Graph 45 Theory. In Section 3 we analyze two core concepts for set-valued TU-games. We prove that the extension of 46 BirdÕs cost allocation rule provides dominance core elements in this game. We also give a family of core 47 solutions that are different from the previous one.
48 2. The game
49
In general, a set-valued TU-game is a pair (N ; V ), where N ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; ng is the set of players and V is a 50 function which assigns to each coalition S N a compact subset V ðSÞ of R k , the characteristic set of co-51 alition S, such that V ð;Þ ¼ 0.
52
Vectors in V ðSÞ represent the worth that the members of coalition S can guarantee by themselves. Notice 53 that the characteristic function in these games are set-to-set maps instead of the usual set-to-point maps. 54
Consider a set of N users of some good that is supplied by a common supplier 0 ðN 0 ¼ N [ f0gÞ. There is 55 a multi-criteria cost associated to the distribution system that has to be divided among the users. This 56 situation can be formulated as a set-valued game with N players and a characteristic function that asso-57 ciates to each coalition S a set V ðSÞ that represent the Pareto-minimum cost of constructing a distribution 58 system among the users in S from the source 0. 59 Let G ¼ ðN 0 ; EÞ be the complete graph with set of nodes N 0 and set of edges (links) denoted by E. There is 60 a vector of costs associated with the use of each link. Let e ij ¼ e ji ¼ ðe
. . . ; e ij k Þ denote the vector-valued 61 cost of using the link fi; jg 2 E. A tree is a connected graph which contains no cycles. A spanning tree for a 62 given connected graph is a tree, with set of nodes equal to the set of nodes of the given graph, and set of 63 edges a subset of the set of edges of the given graph connected and without cycles. A Pareto-minimum cost 64 spanning tree for a given connected graph, with costs on the edges, is a spanning tree which has Pareto-65 minimum costs among all spanning trees (see Ehrgott, 2000) . 
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71 where E T S 0 is the set of edges of the spanning tree, T S 0 , that contains S 0 ¼ S [ f0g; and v À min stands for 72 Pareto-minimization.
73
Remark that the resulting spanning tree T S 0 must contain S 0 but it may also contain some additional 74 nodes.
75 Example 2.1. Consider the complete graph below.
77 77 The bi-criteria Pareto-minimum cost spanning tree game associated to the graph is: 79 79 Note that V ðf3gÞ is (1,5) t because the Pareto-minimum spanning tree that contains the nodes 0 and 3 is the 80 subgraph induced by the edges {0,2} and {2,3}. 81
There are two Pareto-minimum cost spanning trees in the complete graph G for the grand coalition N . 82 The first one correspond to ð2; 6Þ t 2 V ðN Þ and the second one correspond to ð4; 5Þ t 2 V ðN Þ:
84 84 85 The interesting question that arises when a multi-criteria mcst-game, or in general a set-valued TU-game, 86 is played is how to allocate fairly an achievable vector z N 2 V ðN Þ among the players. It is reasonable to think that coalitions only accept allocations if they pay less than any of the worths 98 given by the characteristic set. To simplify the presentation, by X S 6 V ðSÞ we will be denoted that X
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This assumption leads us to introduce the concept of preference core.
101 Definition 3.1. The preference core of a game ðN ; V Þ is the set of allocations, X 2 I Ã ðN ; V Þ, such that 102 X S 6 V ðSÞ 8S & N . We will denote this set as CðN ; v; 6 Þ.
103
In order to characterize the non-emptiness of the preference core, consider a vector z z 2 R k , not neces-104 sarily in V ðN Þ, and the following k scalar games: k ðSÞÞ denote the k-dimensional vector whose components are, 116 respectively, the solutions of the above problems. Conversely, if X S 6 z Ã ðSÞ then X S 6 V ðSÞ.
117
A necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the preference core is given in the next 118 result. This condition is based on the balancedness concept of standard scalar cooperative games. For a 119 definition of balanced games the reader is referred to Owen (1995) . 
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120
128
In scalar mcst-game there exists a simple rule to allocate costs among the users in the game. This al-129 location, called Bird rule (Bird, 1976) , is given by: 130 ''Each player supports the cost of the edge incident upon it on the unique path between 0 and the playerÕs 131 node, in the corresponding minimum spanning tree. '' 132 This rule can be extended to the multi-criteria msct-game by allocating to each player the cost vector of 133 the edge incident upon it on the unique path between 0 and the playerÕs node, in the corresponding Pareto-134 minimum spanning tree.
135 Example 2.1 (Continued). In the example above, we can allocate (2,6) t 2 V ðN Þ by the matrix 1 1 0 1 2 3 136 that is in the preference core. This allocation has been obtained applying BirdÕs rule to the Pareto-minimum 137 tree given in the following figure. 139 139 Nevertheless we can not divide among the players the vector z N ¼ ð4; 5Þ t 2 V ðN Þ by an allocation in the 140 preference core because the game ðN ; v z N 1 Þ given by: 142 142 is not balanced.
143
Unfortunately extended BirdÕs cost allocation scheme is not, in general, a way to obtain allocations in 144 the preference core as we show in the following example. 153 153 Notice that both games are balanced (Owen, 1995) . Therefore the vector (1,8) t can be divided among the 154 three players by allocations in the preference core. For instance, X ¼ 1 0 0 2 3 3 2 CðN ; V ; 6 Þ. However 155 BirdÕs tree allocation, X ¼ 1 0 0 3 3 2 associated with the following Pareto-minimum spanning tree 157 157 158 is not in the preference core because the coalition {1,2} obtains X f1;2g ¼ ð1; 6Þ t and X f1;2g 6 V ðf1; 2gÞ does 159 not hold. 
161
To impose that coalitions only accept allocations in which they pay less than any of the worths given by 162 the characteristic set is too strong. Now suppose that each coalition S will not accept to pay a total cost 163 greater than any of the guaranteed costs in V ðSÞ. This will be denoted in the following by X S jV ðSÞ and 164 means X S jz S 8z S 2 V ðSÞ, that is, there does not exist z S 2 V ðSÞ such that X S j P z S j 8j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k, 165 X S 6 ¼ z S .
166 Definition 3.3. The dominance core of (N ; V ) is the set of allocations, X 2 I Ã ðN ; V Þ, such that 167 X S jV ðSÞ 8S & N . We will denote this set as CðN ; V ; jÞ.
168
BirdÕs cost allocation scheme leads always to an element in the scalar core. In the following result we 169 prove that any vectorial BirdÕs cost allocation belongs to the dominance core. 
As T S is any minimum cost 179 spanning tree on G for S 0 , we can conclude that X S jV ðSÞ. Ã 180 Example 2.1 (Continued). In this example, we show that vector ð4; 5Þ t 2 V ðN Þ can not be allocated among 181 the players by an allocation in the preference core. Nevertheless, as we have seen above, it can be allocated 182 by BirdÕs cost allocation that is an element of the dominance core: 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 CðN ; V ; jÞ.
183
Apart from BirdÕs cost allocations, there are many other allocations in the dominance core. The question 184 that arises is whether we can provide a method to obtain, easily, some of them and whether all the vectors 185 of costs in V ðN Þ can be allocated with this method. 186
A way to deal with this problems is using topological orders in R k . As was shown in Ehrgott (2000) , 187 every Pareto optimal spanning tree of a graph is the conventional mcst using the appropriate topological 188 order. Unfortunately, any topological order may not result in a Pareto optimal tree. Nevertheless, re-189 stricting to topological orders induced by an increasing linear utility function, the mcst obtained from the 190 weighted graph is a Pareto optimal tree. 191
In what follows we are going to consider only topological orders defined by an strictly increasing linear 192 utility function u : R k ! R. In this situation a player or coalition prefers a vector of cost a to another vector 193 b if uðaÞ 6 uðbÞ.
194
In order to find a condition that permits to divide among the players a total cost z N 2 V ðN Þ accordingly 195 with a given strictly increasing linear utility function, u, we will define the following scalar game ðN ; v u Þ: 212 This is a contradiction. Ã 213 Example 2.1 (Continued). Suppose that the strictly increasing linear utility function, u, used to compare the 214 worth of the coalitions consist of giving triple importance to the second criterion, that is, the utility of 215 vector a is uðaÞ ¼ a 1 þ 3a 2 . Then, the scalar game ðN ; v u Þ is:
217 217 In this case, v u ðN Þ ¼ uðð4; 5Þ t Þ, the mcst for the weighted graph is the Pareto-optimal tree associated to 218 z N ¼ ð4; 5Þ t and ðN ; v u Þ is the mcst-game associated to the weighted graph. Unfortunately is not always possible to find a topological order, defined through an increasing linear 226 utility function, for every z N 2 V ðN Þ.
